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Abstract
The Aid E¤ectiveness Literature has recently investigated the e¤ects of
foreign aid on economic growth through country policies. Di¤erent results
have been reached across di¤erent studies mainly due to their sensitivity to
policy measures and data samples. The internal political setting of LDCs
may inuence the e¤ect of aid over policy distortions and represent a rea-
son for this ambiguity. I present a model in which the government has
complete control over the policy implementation. The interaction with
a domestic special interest group which benets from distortions and a
benevolent donor agency a¤ects its decisions. I show that, while the gov-
ernment is always better o¤ when foreign aid is present, the economy may
be characterized by a more or less distorted equilibrium depending on the
way aid modies the policy e¤ect on economic welfare. When aid is more
e¤ective (it reduces the negative e¤ect of the distortion on welfare) the
government has an incentive to pursue higher levels of distortion in order
to extract a larger contribution from the lobby. Aid and the policy distor-
tion become substitutes in the governments utility. Hence the distortion
in equilibrium is larger than the "natural" level it would occur in the ab-
sence of aid. In such a case, the ability of the lobby to extract gains from
aid non trivially leads to a less distorted equilibrium. The same result
generally yields when aid is conditional on the policy implemented. Any-
way I show that the possibility for more-distorted equilibria to arise does
not completely disappear. When the "natural" distortion of the economy
is large, a benevolent donor might still have an incentive in not properly
addressing conditionality issues.
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1 Introduction
The domestic political conditions of less developed countries are closely related
to their policy environment. Aid can a¤ect the political setting of countries.
The other way round, internal political constraints can modify the e¤ects of aid
ows. The present analysis wishes to contribute to the diagnostic side of aid
literature. The understanding of the political conditions under which foreign aid
is disbursed acquires relevant importance in the light of the recent debate about
development strategies. Renewed importance of the issue of ownership of aid
programs emerged1 . Ownership is generally dened as the extent to which a
country is interested in pursuing reforms independently of any incentive provided
by multilateral lenders2" . One of the problem underneath its achievement in-
volves the internal consensus over reforms and policies to be implemented. The
direct recipient of aid is typically the government3 . The presence of domes-
tic lobbies protecting their vested interests (di¤erent from the ones of an ideal
Social Planner) is widely documented in the literature. Becker (1983) repre-
sents the seminal study concerning the political inuence exerted by lobbies.
Olson (1982, 1985) observed that the formation of interest groups which are fa-
vored by the status quo is intrinsic to any process of reform. Cases of lobbying
for trade protection (Grossman and Helpman,1994), consumer and producers
taxes (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997) and innovation technology delay
(Krusell and Rios-Roll,1996) are present for developed countries. The special
interest (and the related rent-seeking) activity exerted for keeping the control of
natural resources (including aid) is mainly investigated in relation to developing
countries4 (Dalmazzo and De Blasio, 2001). Ethnic and linguistic factors play
a key function in the constituency of interest groups, although they are often
associated somehow to the control of resources.
In my analysis the internal political constraint is given by a Special Interest
Group (SIG) that a¤ects the policy decisions of the government by means of
monetary payments. Lobbying activity plays a decisive role in the quality of
policy implemented. As a benchmark case I refer to the model by Grossman
and Helpman (1994)5 . The problem is typically dened as a principal-agent non
cooperative game. The governments objective function depends both on the
overall economic welfare and on the contribution received. It accepts payments
in exchange for the implementation of a certain degree of policy only if its
1See Johnson and Martin in UNDP Human Development Report 2005.
2See Drazen (2000).
3Foreign assistance can be targeted directly to the population. ONGsprojects constitute
an example of this kind of aid. The majority of assistance anyway is channelled through the
government.
4See Boone(1996) on the negative e¤ect on growth caused by natural resources and aid
in elitist regimes and Tornell and Lane (1999) for an analysis of rent-seeking behaviour by
powerful groups.
5This paper initiated the strand of political economy literature about lobbiespolicy inu-
ence, following the original common agency framework of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
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utility is at least as high as maximizing its payo¤ in absence of contributions.
The number of active lobbies inuence the amount of aggregate contribution
in equilibrium. When the interest groups have di¤erent preferences over their
optimal level of distortion, competition allows the government to receive more.
The policy outcome instead is not systematically a¤ected by the number of
interest groups. For simplicity, I limit the analysis to the presence of a single
lobby. The benchmark case, indeed, sees an economy in which a certain degree
of distortion is produced in equilibrium. The aim of the work is to extend
this political setting to the aid context. I consider a benevolent International
Financial Institution (IFI) giving assistance to the country.
It provides aid at a market interest rate and it embodies the economic welfare
of the country in its utility function. Like Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) I
assume foreign assistance to have a positive e¤ect on welfare both directly and
indirectly through the policy. Departing from them I do not restrict to a specic
assumption. I examine the di¤erent marginal e¤ects aid may have and the
equilibrium outcomes that derive from the di¤erent hypothesis.
The empirical literature concerning the relationship between foreign aid and
growth has reached ambiguous results along the last two decades. Scholars
divided into di¤erent strands depending on their ndings. The majority of
them argued that aid is e¤ective in spurring growth in Less Developed Countries
(LDCs) on average6 , but with diminishing returns. Others did not identify a
signicant direct relationship between aid and growth, unless aid is interacted
with a policy variable. The most inuential results come from Burnside and
Dollar (2000) who claim that aid has a positive e¤ect on growth only in a
good policy context. Although their work received severe critiques7 it had an
enormous impact on the aid policies of multilateral donors, driving to a switch
from conditional to selective lending strategies. Finally, a few recent works
nd no robust evidence of a systematic relationship between aid inows into
a country and its economic growth8 , bringing evidence back to some results
already obtained in the 90s9 .
The empirical literature related to the e¤ects of economic policies on growth
is instead far more omogeneous.
Considering the level of distortion produced in equilibrium depending on the
di¤erent marginal e¤ects of aid on policies give us an idea of this indirect e¤ect
of aid on growth. I describe a formal model which may lead both to a "good
equilibrium" in which the presence of aid plays a role in making the government
able to reduce distortions and to a "bad equilibrium" in which the economy
ends up in a more distorted economy compared to the case of the absence of
aid. My analysis incorporates other ndings in the literature, such as Mayer
and Mourmouras (2002) as specic cases of a more general framework.
6See Hansen and Tarp(2001).
7See, among the others, Easterly et al.(2003) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).
8See Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
9See Boone (1996)
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2 Basic model
The political setting of the recipient country is characterized by an economy
in which the government interacts with a domestic special interest group and
an international nancial institution (IFI). Multilateral aid typically comes with
"strungs". Hence I refer to it as I am going to compare the e¤ects of uncondi-
tional and conditional aid. However, results can as well be addressed to bilateral
assistance. Here I consider the role of a single interest group, but the model
can be extended to the presence of more lobbies. Further more, special interest
groups face serious coordination problems when trying to exert a leverage on
political decisions. I also abstract from such issues, assuming underlying collec-
tive action problems to have been already overcome10 . The government chooses
the level of "distortion" which is implicit in the choice of economic policy (for
example, referring to trade protection, any positive tari¤ level represents a posi-
tive degree of distortion, while a 0 distortion would be associated to a free trade
regulation). The distortion   0 negatively a¤ects general economic welfare at
an increasing rate. At the same time, a positive level of distortion has a favor-
able e¤ect on the utility of the Special Interest Group (SIG). For this reason the
group has an incentive to initiate a lobbying activity in order to inuence the
decisions of the political authorities. The members of the lobby o¤er a payment
schedule that enters directly the governments utility function. I assume that
these contributions have an e¤ect only on the welfare of the government but
do not a¤ect the overall welfare of the economy. In this sense we are implicitly
considering the SIG to be external to the government. A di¤erent strand of the
literature focuses on the role played by agents who wish to inuence political
decisions from within the government.11 . The governments policy choice also
depends on the amount of nancial assistance received by the IFI. This holds
whether aid is conditional or unconditional on the policy implemented as aid
positively a¤ects the economic welfare function in any case.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) identify the conditions for the existence of
truthful equilibria in a common agency game in which domestic lobbies o¤er
contributions to the government to inuence its trade policies12 . Mayer and
Mourmouras (2002) extend the analysis to the aid context. They also consider
the possibility of aid repayment. For the moment I do not take into account
repayment issues. Aid disbursement takes the form of a grant and bears no costs
for the recipient country. Typically, IFIs give aid both in the form of grants and
of subsidized loans. In Appendix 1 I discuss how equilibrium outcome is a¤ected
by the presence of aid repayment.
The consumers and the lobby have di¤erent preferences. Aggregate welfare
10See Olson (1965) for a detailed analysis of the circumstances leading to the solution of
collective action problems.
11For example, Drazen(2001), related to the aid context.
12The seminal paper about the characterization of truthful equilibria in a common agency
game is Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Grossman and Helpman (1994) extended this set to
an economic policy environment.
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(W ( ; A)) depends both on the welfare of the consumers(W c( ; A)) and on the
utility of the lobby(W l()). Since I consider the case of a single lobby, its weight
is very small with respect to that of the citizens.
Aggregate welfare W ( ; A) is dened as follows
W ( ; A) =
X
c
W c(A; ) +
X
l
W l() (1)
where c 2 [1; N ] is an index for the consumer and l 2 [1; J ] is and index for
the lobby member, since J = P  N . P is the total amount of the population
that is normalized to 1. Consumers receive an equal proportion of welfare and
the citizens who belong to the lobby equally share benets derived from the
distortion13 . I can write this expression
W ( ; A) = (1  )W c(A; ) + W l(); 0 <  < 1 (2)
where  is the share of the population belonging to the lobby, A equals the
amount of nancial assistance disbursed, W c < 0 and W
l
 > 0.
Note that A only a¤ects the welfare of the consumers. When  is close to 0,
the second term disappears and the aggregate welfare coincides with that of the
consumers, W ( ; A) = W c(A; ). Since I assume that only one lobby is active
in the economy, I rely on this simplication.
An example of  is a tari¤ on some import goods which benets the industry
producing that specic good domestically. Alternatively, it can be seen as a scal
distortion in favor of certain producers or of a part of the population controlling
some kind of resources.
For a given ow of assistance A, the economys welfare is maximized when
there is no distortion,  = 0. The presence of the distortion has a negative e¤ect
on welfare, at an increasing rate: W < 0 and W < 0.
The governments objective function depends on economic welfare and on
the payment schedule o¤ered by the SIG:
G( ; A; a) = aW ( ; A) + C() (3)
where a > 0 is a parameter that identies the governments interest for the
public welfare. The parameter a identies the implicit weight attached to the
welfare of the consumers compared to the contribution. It can also measure
the quality of institutions. Its value becomes a measure of the intensity of the
governments preferences. In the basic version of the model a is exogenous. The
government accepts assistance from the IFI because WA  0 , a positive level
13 I assume that the members of the lobby group do not participate as consumers or citizens
in the aggregate welfare. This simplication does not produce any relevant variation in the
results.
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of aid has a positive e¤ect on economic welfare. I assume that aid enhances
aggregate welfare at a decreasing rate, WA < 0.
The Special Interest Groups welfare function depends negatively on its con-
tribution schedule to the government (C()) and positively on the benets it
obtains from the economic distortion.
L() = U()  C() (4)
The lobbys utility function is increasing in the level of distortion at a de-
creasing rate: U > 0 , U < 0.
As the distortion rises, its impact on the general welfare may generate nega-
tive esternalities that reduce the positive returns of the distortion on the utility
of the lobby. I also assume that U(0) = 0, the utility of the lobby is null if no
distortion takes place14 .
Finally, the IFIs objective function is given by
I( ; A) =W ( ; A)  rA (5)
The IFI bears a cost r > 0 for nancing aid. This parameter represents the
market interest rate at which the IFI nances its operations.
3 Domestic political equilibrium with no foreign
assistance
I begin the analysis by solving for the internal political equilibrium in the ab-
sence of foreign assistance. This will serve as a benchmark that will allow to
distinguish the specic e¤ect of aid on the political setting. In these circum-
stances I only need to understand how the governments decisions about the
degree of distortion to adopt is inuenced by the presence of the lobby. The
problem can be set as follows.
The lobby and the government are the actors of a non cooperative game
in two stages. In the rst period the SIG o¤ers the government a contribution
schedule C() and commits to its payment. In the second period the government
decides the level of distortion that maximizes its own welfare, taking into account
its related payment. Solving the game by backward induction this leads to
max

aW () + C() (6)
14 In Appendix 2 I introduce the hypothesis that the utility function of the lobby also depends
on aid. Departing from the literature I show which changes this di¤erent setting may produce
on the political equilibrium in order to capture the e¤ects of potential aid appropriability
features by the domestic lobby.
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that results in the following f.o.c.
aW + C = 0: (7)
The government will be willing to accept a contribution from the lobby only
if its welfare will result at least as large as without receiving the contribution15 .
The government participation constraint becomes
aW () + C() > aW (0) (8)
For this condition to hold a lower bound level of distortion that maximizes
G() such that C() = 0 has to exist. It follows from the previous hypothesis
that this value of  is equal to 0. In the rst stage the lobby determines its
contribution schedule that maximizes its welfare function, given the strategy of
the government.
max

U()  C() (9)
s.t. aW + C = 0 (10)
aW ()+C() = aW (0)
(p.c.)
The participation constraint is limited to the strict equality in the lobby
problem, because the SIG has no interest in contributing the government more
than the amount that leaves it as well o¤as if the contribution were not received.
A larger contribution schedule would not result in a credible ex post o¤er.
As the contribution function enters linearly both in the governments welfare
function and in the lobbys objective function, solving (9) and (10) together is
equivalent to maximizing the joint utility of the lobby and the government. Fol-
lowing Proposition 1, p.839, in Grossman and Helpman(1994) it can be veried
that all the conditions for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this
policy game are satised.
The combination (C; ) identies a SPNE of the non cooperative policy
game if:
Condition 1: C 2 [0; C]
where C > 0 is the total amount of resources available to the lobby.
When C is feasible, the lobby cannot spend more than its total resources
in nancing the government with a positive contribution.
Condition 2:  = argmax G(),   0
15When the lobby is not active the value of the distortion for which the government maxi-
mizes its utility is 0.
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Given the contribution set by the SIG, the government chooses the distortion
level in order to maximize its own welfare.
Condition 3:  = argmax [G() + L()];   0
In equilibrium no resources are wasted. The equilibrium is e¢ cient, as
the joint utility of the government and the lobby is maximized.
Condition 4: 9   0 that maximizes aW () + C() such that C() = 0
There exists a value of policy distortion that requires no contribution
from the lobby, at which the government is just as well o¤ as at :As
we discussed above here  = 0:16
Condition 2 and 3 together imply that the contribution schedule is locally
truthful around the equilibrium distortion. The intuition for truthful contri-
bution is that he marginal cost of contributing must be equal to the marginal
benet derived from  . This guarantees that the payment schedule o¤ered by
the lobby reects its true preferences and it is optimal ex post. If it were not
the case, commitment would not be credible.
The solution for the No Aid case (NA) is implicitly given by
U (NA) =  aW (NA) (11)
and, from (p.c.), the contribution in equilibrium will be
CNA(NA) = a[W (0) W (NA)] > 0 (12)
Here I restrict the analysis to positive values of the contribution17 . The same
result must hold for the maximization problem of the lobby in equation (9) s.t.
(10). The combination (CNA(NA); NA) I have derived is the unique solution
of the non cooperative game.
The governments indi¤erence curves can represented (Gi) in a ( ; C) plane.
They are positively sloped and convex18 (see Fig.1)
The lobbys indi¤erence curves show the combination of the policy distortion
and the contribution to the government, for each utility level. Since its marginal
utility is positive at a decreasing rate, they are upward-sloping19 and concave.
In equilibrium the slopes of the two indi¤erence curves must be equal:
16This condition is far more important in the case of two or more lobbies. It guarantees
that none of the lobby has a space for augmenting the contribution of an " in order to induce
the government to modify the policy in its favor. Until the condition is not respecetd lobbies
keep on competing eachother to make the governement choose a more favorable policy. That
is why with multiple principals the government acquires all the surplus in equilibrium.
17Explicitly considering the lobby as part of the aggregate welfare also allows to analyze
the case in which the SIG is able to extract resources from the government. This ability is
proportional to the size of the lobby group.
18Their slope is @C=@ jdG=0=  aW > 0 and, since I assume that policy distortion
negatively a¤ects welfare levels at an increasing rate, we have W < 0. It follows that
@2C=@2 jdG=0=  aW > 0 so that the indi¤erence curves are positively sloped and convex.
19Since @C=@ jdL=0= U > 0 and @2C=@2 jdL=0= U < 0 the lobbys indi¤erence
curves are increasing and concave.
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 aW = U (13)
This is the solution of the game that I have already derived. As expected, the
level of the distortion in equilibrium diminishes when the government cares more
about the public welfare (political authorities need to obtain a larger consensus),
that is when a increases.20 C(NA) will equal the amount that is enough to
compensate the government from the reduction in welfare caused by a positive
distortion. As I have already discussed, the lobby has no incentive to contribute
more to the government. Thus the equilibrium holds at the tangency point of
the a lobbys indi¤erence curve, named LE , and the lower governments contour,
named G021 (L curves correspond to higher utilities the lower they are).
tt NA
LE
G0
C*(t NA)
C(t ) G2
G21
L0
Figure 1: Domestic political equilibrium without aid
The equilibrium contribution is derived from G0. The government in equi-
librium reaches the same utility it would get if no contribution were given,
G(NA) = aW (0). The lobbys net utility is L(NA) = U(NA)   a[W (0)  
W (NA)]:Things would be di¤erent if more than one lobby were present. As
Grossman and Helpman (1994) show, when many special interest groups com-
pete to inuence the government, the surplus is entirely appropriated by the
20This follows from @U=@a > 0.
21Nor  either C are allowed to be negative, and when  = 0, C(0) = 0. The lobby has
to leave the government as better o¤ as if there were no contribution, otherwise there is no
incentive to participate in the game. In absence of contributions the government maximizes
its welfare for  = 0. Hence, the equilibrium indi¤erence curve passes through the origin.
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government. Because of this competition the aggregate contribution in equilib-
rium is larger.
4 Domestic political equilibrium in the presence
of unconditional aid
I now consider the case in which a country receives foreign assistance which is
not conditional on the implemented policies. Aid has a positive e¤ect on welfare
and non zero e¤ects on the policy distortions. I will show that the way in which
aid and policy distortions interact is crucial for equilibrium outcome.
The problem is described by a three period non cooperative game with three
actors. The aid donor moves rst and decides how much assistance to disburse
to the recipient country. After observing the amount of aid given the lobby sets
a contribution schedule to inuence the political authorities over their policy
decisions. In the last period, after aid and contribution schedules have been set,
the government chooses the level of distortion. The di¤erent agentsobjective
functions are common knowledge. As in a complete information game à la
Stackelberg, the IFI has a rst mover advantage. For given aid, the conditions
for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium analyzed in section 2 must still hold
for the second and the third stage of the game. The solution (A) will be a
function of the policy distortion to changes in the aid level A. Conditions of the
previous section are modied as follows:
Condition 1: C has to be feasible. As before, the contribution must
not exceed the total amount of resources available to the lobby.
C  [0;C];C > 0:
Condition 2:for   0; A > 0;  maximizes the governments objective
function, for given aid:
 = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() (14)
Condition 3: for   0, A  0,  has to maximize the joint welfare of
the government and the SIG, for given aid :
 = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() + U()  C() (15)
Condition 4: there must exist a level of distortion that maximizes
governments objective function and that requires a null contribution.
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9 = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() : C() = 0 (16)
Solving the maximization in Condition 2I obtain aW (; A)+C () = 0.
Substituting this result into Condition 3yields the expression for a truthful
contribution22 by the lobby group: U () = C (). From the two expressions
above I can derive the solution of the subgame between the lobby and the
government of the aid recipient country:
W (
; A) =  (1=a)U () (17)
which implicitly denes the equilibrium level of the policy distortion as a
function of aid, (A).
As a consequence, the optimal contribution schedule, for any given A, be-
comes
C((A)) = a[[W (0; A) W (; A)] (18)
Observe that whether the amount of the contribution is lower or higher in
the absence of foreign assistance depends on the marginal e¤ect of aid on the
distortion. When an increase in aid lowers the negative e¤ect of distortions
(WA > 0) the contribution that compensates the government for its lost util-
ity is lower. If aid has diminishing returns also indirectly through the policy
(WA < 0) the cost of bearing each degree of distortion is larger. Hence a
greater contribution is required to compensate the welfare depleament.
In order to solve the rst stage of the game I need to specify the government
policy reaction function to changes in aid. From (17) we can determine its slope:
d
dA
(G)
=   aWA
aW + U
(19)
By assumption the denominator is always negative. The slope of the policy
response curve depends on the sign of the cross derivative WA.
A negative W cA tells us that an increase in aid reduces the marginal e¤ect
of the distortion. As the marginal e¤ect of the distortion on welfare is negative,
a rise in aid induces a stronger depleament of the economy, for each level of
distortion. Since W ( ; A) is a continous function, WA =WA . A worsening of
the distortion reduces the marginal benet of aid.
A positive WA tells us us the opposite story. The negative e¤ect of the
policy distortion on aggregate welfare falls, as aid increases. In practice a rise in
aid decreases the rate at which policy distortions deteriorate economic welfare.
This hypothesis can t to distortions like high decit. An increase in aid may
relax the governments budget constraint and make the distortion less costly.
22Following Bernheim and Whinston(1986), I dene a truthful contribution schedule as a
contribution schedule that everywhere reects the true preferences of the lobby. The S.I.G.
pays to the government the excess (if any) of the lobbys gross welfare at  relative to some
base level of welfare. Formally C(;B) = max[0; U() B], for some B.
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Foreign assistance takes many di¤erent forms and might produce di¤erent
kinds of spillovers on the policy environment. One hypothesis could be better
applied to certain circumstances and the opposite to others. For the sake of
generality I will characterize the equilibria in both cases and I will focus on their
di¤erences to describe a possible reason for the ambiguity of results obtained
by the empirical literature on the e¤ect of aid on growth.
In order to identify the equilibrium levels of foreign assistance and policy
distortion, and consequently of the lobbys contribution, I must describe the
IFIs welfare contours. Their slope is given by
d
dA
(I)
=  WA   r
W
(20)
where the denominator is always negative and WA is always positive. When
W cA > r, which occurs for lower values of A, the slope of the IFIs objective
function is positive. When WA < r, for higher values of A, it is negative.
As W ( ; A) is increasing in A, with diminishing returns, the highest welfare
contour of the IFI reduces to a point when  equals 0: IFIs utility reduces as
its contour curves lie farther from the A axis. The condition W cA = [r=(1 )]
implicitly identies a function (A) which constitutes the set of points where
the indi¤erence curvesslope changes.23 When an increase in foreign assistance
has a stronger e¤ect in improving welfare compared to the marginal cost of
nancing it, the combination of both larger values at  and aid give rise to the
same amount of utility for the IFI (the slope is positive). The slope is negative,
instead, (that is, higher values of the distortion are associated to lower values
of assistance) when the marginal benet of aid on economic welfare (WA) is
lower than the marginal cost of nancing aid (r). This occurs for lower values
of aid as aid has decreasing returns. In Figure 2 I draw examples of possible
equilibria. For a matter of comparison to the the benchmark and the conditional
case I invert the axes with respect to expressions (19) and (20). Policy response
function is depicted as line for simplicity. It has to pass through NA since,
when no aid is given, the political game leads to that amount of distortion. Its
concavity might change, but the sign of its slope is always whether positive or
negative, depending on the sign of WA.Graphically the equilibrium is reached
when the governments reaction function is tangent to an IFIs welfare contour.
Their slopes will have the same value in that point, though we can rewrite the
equilibrium condition as
  aWA
aW + U
=  W
c
A   r
W
(21)
This expression implicitly denes the equilibrium combination ((A); A).
The corresponding optimal contribution of the lobby is therefore C( ; A) =
23This function is dened by the combination of  and A correspondent to the highest level
of distortion for each level of the IFIs welfare. As an increase in  , for given A, makes the
IFIs utility decline we can draw conclusions about the concavity of the map of the welfare
contours without calculating its expression.
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a[W (0; A)  W (; A)]. The equilibrium is not necessarily unique, but only
two kinds may occur. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium as less-
distorted or more-distorted with respect to the case of no aid. When WA
is negative, the reaction function of the government is decreasing, though the
tangency point has to lie on the concave decreasing tract of the IFIs welfare
contour. This equilibrium would be characterized by a positive amount of aid
and by a small value of distortion , lower than NA. If W cA > 0 instead, the
equilibrium point (; A) has to lie on the increasing part of the IFIs map
of welfare contours thus leading to an equilibrium in which the level of policy
distortion is certainly higher than NA. In order to understand the position of
the government I give the expression of its utility slope:
d
dA
(G)
=   aWA
aW + C
(22)
This is negative for lower  and positive for larger  . For low levels of the
distortion the marginal benet gained from the contribution is stronger than the
marginal depleament of the economic welfare, though the governments utility
does not vary as aid decreases. When the distortion is larger, the marginal
contribution is not su¢ cient to compensate for the worsening of economic per-
formance and, in order to maintain the same level of utility, the government
needs to receive larger amounts of aid. As it can be seen in Figure 2, in each
kind of equilibrium the government is better o¤. It reaches a higher indi¤erence
curve (GE) with respect to the case of no aid (G0). Is it possible to draw similar
conclusions in terms of aggregate welfare? Economic welfare positively depends
on aid and negatively depends on distortions. Hence it can be drawn as an
increasing curve24 . Certainly, for WA < 0 the overall welfare increases, but the
result is not obvious if I end up in more distorted equilibrium.
UAtUAtNAt NAt
A(t )
t t
A*
0>AWt 0<AWt
A*
G0
GE GE
IE
IE
A(t  )
G0
Figure 2: Domestic political equilibrium with unconditional aid
24 Its slope is given by d
dA
(W )
=  WA
W
> 0. An example is drawn in Figure 2.
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When aid is fungible, which is likely when it is not conditional on specic
policies, its role in reducing the cost of the distortion on aggregate welfare can
lead the economy to a worse policy environment. Furthermore, although the
"good equilibrium" is associated to a level of welfare above the equilibrium with
no foreign assistance, this is not necessarily the case in the "bad equilibrium"
since both aid and distortion have increased. This produces opposite e¤ects
on economic welfare. In Appendix 2 I show how the chance of appropriating
some aid by the lobby group has a non trivial positive e¤ect on the equilibrium
outcome and might drive economy from the more distorted equilibrium to the
more favorable one, despite of the positive cross marginal e¤ect of aid. The
complementarity e¤ect between aid and distortions is reduced when they become
substitutes inside the lobbys utility function.
5 Domestic political equilibrium in the presence
of conditional aid
Conditionality of foreign assistance has been the topic of an important debate
over the aid implementation strategies by all multilateral donor agencies. Since
the role of proper economic reforms has been considered a core requisite to en-
hance economic growth the idea of conditioning aid giving to the implementation
of specic policy changes has been pursued.
I now consider the case when aid is conditional on the distortion. The frame-
work turns to a common agency game in which two principals, the IFI and the
special interest group wish to condition the governments policy choice. At the
beginning of the game the IFI and the lobby simultaneously o¤er an assistance
and a contribution schedule to the political authorities. That reduces the tim-
ing of the game to two periods. In the second and nal stage the government
sets the degree of distortion, after observing both the payment schedules aimed
at a¤ecting its decisions in the opposite sense. Their objectives are in fact not
aligned. While the lobby, exactly as in the previous section, benets from an
increase of the distortion, the IFI o¤ers assistance to obtain a lower level of it.
Grossman and Helpmans work we have been referring up to now was specif-
ically targeted to a common agency situation. In order to characterize the
equilibrium of the game I have to adapt the aforementioned conditions to the
presence of two principals.
The combination of the level of distortion, the assistance schedule and the
contribution schedule (CA; ACA; CCA) represents a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of the non cooperative game with conditional aid if the following con-
ditions are respected.
Condition 1: both C and A are feasible.
Condition 2: CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) + CCA();   0
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a[W +WAA ] + C = 0 (23)
Condition 3:CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) + CCA() + U()  CCA();
  0
a[W +WAA ] + C + U   C = 0 (24)
Condition 4:CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) + U()] + CCA()+
+ W ( ; ACA())  rACA();   0
a[W +WAA ] + C + [W +WAA ]  rAp = 0 (25)
Condition 5:9  0 and  00 that maximize aW ( ; A()) + C() : C( 0) = 0
and A( 00) = 0 ; respectively.
Condition 1adds the requirement for the payment schedule not to exceed
the available resources also to the aid donor agency. Conditions 2 and 3
resemble the ones of the conditional case with the only di¤erence that now A
is not given, but it is a function of the distortion. Condition 4 requires that
also the joint welfare of the government and the "new" principal, the IFI, has
to be maximized. If this condition were not satised together with 3the lobby
or the IFI could propose di¤erent schedules more benecial to their welfare.
Finally Condition 5requires the existence of two levels of distortion for which
the governments objective function is maximized, when, alternatively, one of
the two payment schedules is null. This implies that the government in such
cases has to be as well o¤ as at the equilibrium level, otherwise there would be
space to modify its decisions over  and gain a larger welfare level.
The two principals, when xing their payment schedule, have now also to
consider the other principals optimal strategy. I have to verify both the con-
tribution schedule and the aid funding to be truthful. When conditions 2and
3 and 2 and 4 are satised at the same time, we obtain the expressions,
respectively, for a truthful contribution and a truthful assistance.
CCA = U (26)
ACA =  
W
WA   r (27)
Truthful contribution is always positive and rises with the level of distor-
tion at an increasing rate exactly in same fashion as the utility function of
the lobby. In practice, as stated in Grossman and Helpman (1994) the shape
of the contribution function mirrors the one of the utility function. Truthful
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assistance instead potentially might both increase or decrease with the level of
distortion depending on the size of the marginal benet of aid on consumers
welfare (that is incorporated in the IFIs objective function). The right side of
(27) also represents the slope of the IFIs welfare contours in a ( ; A) plane. As
the numerator is negative by denition the slope turns from positive to negative
from lower to higher values of A. The equation WA   r implicitly denes the
set of ( ; A) combinations where the sign of the slope changes and also, when
 = 0, the value of aid the IFI would disburse to the government in the ab-
sence of any lobbying activity. When conditionality issues are considered, the
hypothesis of restricting the analysis to the case of negative A seems reason-
able, but the scope of the present work is to underline the possible reasons for
proper incentives to be dismissed. We investigate what changes might occur in
equilibrium if this is the case. Substituting the truthful paymentsexpressions
into (23) gives
U =   arW
WA   r > 0 (28)
The equation yielding to the equilibrium expression is satised when the IFIs
welfare is maximized and when the joint welfare of the government and the lobby
group is maximized. Graphically this corresponds to the tangency point of a
IFIs welfare contour and a governments welfare contour (obtained considering
the truthful contribution of the lobby) in a ( ; A) plane. Governments contours
slope is given by
dA
d
(G)
=  aW + U
aWA
(29)
which is negative for smaller values of  and positive for larger ones. The
equilibrium condition becomes
  W
WA   r =  
aW + U
aWA
(30)
which, solved for U , gives the expression in (28). If I restrict to the case of
donor agencies designing foreign assistance programs such that domestic gov-
ernments are forced to lower policy distortion (when WA   r < 0 ) a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium can only occur on the decreasing part of the govern-
ments welfare contour. Furthermore, as Condition 5has to be respected, the
equilibrium point lies on the governments welfare contour passing for the value
of distortion that maximizes its welfare when no aid is given (named NA in
section 1). This allows us to observe that the level of distortion CA produced
in the equilibrium with conditional aid is lower than the one the internal polit-
ical setting would reach in the absence of foreign assistance. This result holds
also when the cross marginal e¤ect of aid to policy distortion is positive. In this
case the distortion will be smaller with respect to the unconditional case, but
we cannot be sure of this benet to hold if the cross marginal e¤ect of aid is
negative. Whether the distortion in equilibrium results weaker will depend on
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the relative slope (in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium) of the government
policy reaction function of the unconditional case and the one of the govern-
ments welfare function in the conditional setting. The steeper one produces the
more distorted equilibrium, not only in terms of  , but also of aid disbursed.
Whatever the point reached, the government will end up in a lower welfare
curve with respect to the case of aid disbursed without conditions. In general
the government is worse o¤ with respect to the unconditional case.
As before, comparing the IFIs welfare in the two cases leads to a clear
result when aid is more e¤ective in reducing the negative impact of distortions
(WA > 0). By conditioning aid, the IFI reaches a utility curve closer to the
A   axis, that generates a larger welfare for her. When aid is less e¤ective on
the policy setting (WA < 0) we cannot draw an a priori conclusion. The same
reasoning applies when we try to compare the aggregate welfare of the economy
in the two circumstances.
In my opinion, it is worthy to notice that to obtain such an equilibrium I had
to assume the A() function to be negative in  , its shape did not result from
the equilibrium requirements. Potentially though, by relaxing the hypothesis,
another kind of equilibrium is possible. When we allow assistance schedule to be
positive (WA  r > 0) he occurrence of an equilibrium along the increasing part
of the governments welfare contour is possible. If such an equilibrium exists the
economy might still be characterized by a degree of policy distortion superior to
the one obtained when no aid is disbursed. (See Figure 3(right)) Observe that
when aid nancing is more costly for the IFI the possibility of more distorted
equilibria to occur reduces.
)(tA
G0
G0
A*
A*
)(tA
CAttCAt NAt NAt
IE
IE
0<tA 0>tA
Figure 3: Domestic political equilibrium with conditional aid
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6 Conclusions
I developed a theoretical framework that allows to analyze the e¤ect of for-
eign aid in a country in which a special interest group actively attempts to
inuence the government policy decisions. The key assumption lies in aid af-
fecting the welfare of the economy both directly and indirectly through the
policy. When aid is disbursed unconditionally with respect to the policy im-
plemented, the equilibrium outcome strictly depends on the way aid interacts
with the distortion. Aid literature has typically considered their cross marginal
e¤ect on welfare to be negative, especially relying on the results by Burnside
and Dollar(2000). In analyzing the aid-growth regression they conclude that
the relationship is positive only after including an aidpolicy interaction term.
The interaction term reveals a positive sign. Since their variable was an index
measuring "good policy" it would be associated to a negative cross marginal
e¤ect between the level of distortion and foreign aid (W cA < 0) in the light of
my analysis. This paper had a big impact on multilateral donorsaid strategies,
probably because these ndings were embodied in the 1998 World Bank Report
about aid25 . Later works demonstrate the fragilities of the results26 . My intent
is to stress the possibility for the opposite assumption to hold. Think of  ; for
example, as a scal distortion favoring some specic good producers (or also, as
a suboptimally implemented tax collection technology ). An increase in the dis-
tortion has a negative e¤ect on public welfare, because the citizens su¤er from
a decrease in redistribution. The government cares about the population, but
it is o¤ered a contribution by the group of producers to implement a positive
distortion. In these circumstances, if the government also receives foreign assis-
tance, the cost of accepting the reform diminishes, because the resources derived
from aid allows the government to relax its budget constraint. Technically this
corresponds to having WA > 0: The resulting equilibrium distortion is larger
than the one obtained in the absence of aid. The economy ends up in a more
distorted equilibrium when foreign assistance is present. Larger distortions yield
to a decrease in the growth rate. Observe that whenever aid is fungible, that
is when the government is free to allocate the additional resources according
to its preferences27 , the aforementioned situation is very likely to occur. From
a slightly di¤erent perspective, we can think of the government as having two
"souls". A benevolent stream pursues collective welfare and addresses redistri-
bution issues and bureaucrats are paid by the rich to set lower taxes. Acemoglu
25For further details see "Assessing aid: what works, what doesnt and why", World Bank
Report, 1998.
26Easterly at al.(2004), on the American Economic Review, the same journal where "Aid,
policies and growth" was published, demonstrated that Burnside and Dollars ndings were
not robust to an extension of the sample and were strongly dependent on the role of 5 outliers.
Other critics came from Hansen and Tarp(2001) and Ram(2004).
27Fungibility does not necessarily implies that aid transfers are not targeted to specic
sectors. If the government has the chance to divert resources from the aid assisted sectors
to others, anyway, foreign assistance simply translates into extra resources available to the
government.
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et al.(2007) describe such a patronage political model in order to identify a
possible determinant of the emergence and persistence of ine¢ cient states. Fis-
cal implementation and collection require the presence of bureaucrats. They
show how the surge of an ine¢ cient state structure can be pursued by the rich
elite in order to reduce redistribution and public good provision in newborn
democracies. My analysis is coherent with this kind of framework.
When we turn to conditionality it is possible to achieve a less distorted equi-
librium also in the case of positive marginal e¤ect of aid on distortions, but it
is not possible to exclude the occurrence of bad equilibria completely. As the
International Financial Institution incorporates the welfare of the country in
its utility, in presence of very high distortions its commitment to conditional-
ity might reveal weak. Remember that distortions negatively a¤ect economic
welfare at an increasing rate (W < 0). When the distortion is high and the
marginal benet of aid is larger than the marginal cost of funding it, the IFI
may prefer to increase aid as the distortion tends to worsen. This occurs for
low levels of aid, since foreign assistance, instead, a¤ects economic welfare at a
decreasing rate. When the cost of nancing aid increases, the space for "bad"
equilibria to occur reduces. In this sense, the market interest rate r could as
well be interpreted as an indirect measure of conditionality-enforcement poten-
tial. There is widespread evidence that the conditionality of foreign assistance
did not ultimately produce the expected results on LDCs growth28 . One of the
reasons has been attributed to distorted incentives on the donorsside. Often
multilateral institutionsaid programs are designed to realize a disbursement,
notwithstanding the e¤ective compliance of imposed conditions. This happens
because the monitoring/evaluating phase is scarsely implemented or the agen-
ciessta¤scarrier is somehow more attached to the amount of disbursements
than to the e¤ective returns on them. This basically prevents coherent strategies
to be pursued. Broad and uninformed western public consensus over "something
has to be done for the poors" anyway might have strengthen these counterpro-
ductive attitudes.
My considerations are also in line with the literature investigating the causes
of delay on reforms. Lobbies controlling natural resources buy the government
not to implement reforms that possibly undermine their vested interests. For-
eign assistance might deteriorate the policy setting when it increases the govern-
ments payo¤, for any given level of distortion, because it makes the government
less sensitive to the costs of not implementing the reforms.
7 Appendix 1: Aid repayment
Here I briey show how the results derived above vary when receiving foreign
assistance is costly for the recipient country. The rate of repayment on aid
28See Mosley(1985), for instance.
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disbursment equals . The market interest rate is r > 0. Economys net
welfare becomes:
W ( ; A; b) = a[W ( ; A)  1+1+rA]
where b = [(1 + )=(1 + r)]. Typically international organization make
loans at favorable rates of interest. When  equals  1 aid represents a grant
and the assumption here is that  1   < r , in this latter case aid becoming
a subsidized loan. I dene b the rate of repayment and symmetrically (1   b)
the rate of subsidizing by the IFI. The extent of the subsidy depends on the
prevailing market interest rate. The government accepts assistance only when
the marginal benet from aid exceeds its marginal cost (WA   b > 0).
The equilibrium conditions of the unconditional and the conditional case
become respectively
  aWA
aW + U
=  W
c
A   (b+ r)
W
(31)
  W
WA   (b+ r) =  
aW + U
a(WA   b) (32)
As I briey discussed before the results do not vary much. An increase
in b makes the equilibrium distortion lower for less-distorted equilibria ( when
WA < 0) and higher for more-distorted equilibria (when WA > 0) in the
unconditional framework. In the conditional case, since b diminishes the slope
of the governments welfare contours and increases the slope of the IFIs welfare
contours, it has a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium distortion. The rate of
repayment in general has the same e¤ect of the market interest rate. Its presence
amplies the e¤ect of r. It can be said that aid being costly, from both the
donors and the recipients side has a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium distortion.
8 Appendix 2: Domestic political equilibrium
with aid expropriability
Considering the possibility for the special interest group to gain some positive
benet from foreign aid leads to non trivial di¤erences in the results obtained
before. If we allow for lobbys utility to positively depend on aid directly, as if
the S.I.G. would be able to appropriate some of the resources deriving from aid
we end up facing an interesting situation.
Considering the variations of the hypothesis the model modies as follows
G( ; A) = aW ( ; A) + C()
the governments welfare function is unchanged;
L(A; ) = U(A; )  C()
where U now depends also on A.
As it was discussed above, marginal utility is increasing in aid, which leads
to UA > 0. The assumption is that UA < 0. Aid constitutes an additional
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resource for the lobby, the returns on it will depend on the technological features
characterizing its activity function. We consider decreasing return to scale as
in the standard literature.
In the conditional case the tangency point between the governments welfare
contour and the IFIs utility curve is
 aWA + UA
aW + U
(G)
=  WA   r
W
(I)
(33)
When UA is low enough it can overcome the e¤ect of a positive WA: The
fact that the lobby is able to appropriate some benets from aid make aid and
distortions substitute within the lobbys utility function. This leads to a lower
distortion in equilibrium even when aid and distortions are already substitutes
in the governments objective function (WA > 0).
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